



SECURITY is not complete without U

Evolution of Computer Security Threats and Models

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What is Computer Security?

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► Handling security incidents

- Policies
- Investigation & forensics
- Cooperation & coordination

➤ Not (really) part of this presentation

► Preventing security incident

- Architecture/software design & implementation
- *Hardening* of existing architecture/software

➤ Against what, why, how and up to what level?

► Evaluate the situation (Risk assessment)

- Who are the attackers? What do they want?
- What are your assets?
- What are the threats?
- What are the consequences?

► Seal most dangerous holes & re-evaluate

Security Continuous Integration

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► Evaluate the situation (Risk assessment)

- Who are the attackers? What do they want?
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- What are the threats?
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► Seal most dangerous holes & re-evaluate

► Service Agility: Impact of new services/features?


► Follow attacker evolutions & re-evaluate:

- Are there new attackers?
- Are there new attacks, new trends?

Finding the correct equilibrium

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► Compromises & equilibrium:




How much an
incident might
“cost” you

How much
prevention will
“cost” you

Finding the correct equilibrium

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► Compromises & equilibrium:



How much
would an
attacker gain

How much an
attacker need
to invest

What are attackers after?

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► Bragging & Reputation

- Attack well known entities
- Try to get as much exposure as possible
- Can create noise about any “hack”, even insignificant ones

➤ **Difficult to prevent, damage control required**

► Political & ideological goal (Hacktivists)

- Mostly anything can be a target
- Sometime similar to standard bragging

➤ **Difficult to prevent, damage control required**

► Money (professional hackers)

➤ **Rational, methodic**

How to make money from hacking?

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► Stolen resources:

- Sell resources to other 'business' partners
 - Send spam (non-legitimate business offers)
 - Send phishing:
 - Malware (malicious attachments)
 - Forged forms asking for passwords
 - Links to Phishing Web pages
 - DDOS: Use distributed resources to disturb (public) services
- Host malicious content:
 - Phishing web sites (steal more credentials)
 - Malicious architecture (hide your tracks & high availability)
- Inject malicious links/ads/content to existing websites
- Mine crypto-currencies

How to make money from hacking?

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► Infected computers

- Ads & popups
- Pay per install software
- Blackmail (including Crypto-lockers)
- Banking malware
- Steal credentials

► Stolen data

- Sell credit card numbers
- Sell users private data (for phishing and social engineering)
- Sell corporate data

New variable: Crypto-currencies



► Fully functional currencies:

- Concepts of *accounts*, transactions
- Double-spending impossible


► No 'banks' required (but some exist):

- Accounts are auto generated:
 - Private key (used to sign transaction)
 - Address (derived from private key)
- Transactions are *verified* by miners

► Exchanges with *real* currencies

Transactions everywhere (chains)

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
► Block:

- Contains aggregated valid transaction
- *Proof of work*: hard computing problem
 - BTC: $\text{hash}(\text{block}) < \text{target}$

► Miners:

- Hash blocks until someone find good one
- Paid:
 - Per solved block
 - Per transaction (if it included a mining fee)

Change rate (BTC-USD) explosion



Crypto-currencies: Security implications

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- ▶ Easy and *reliable* way to make money from [CG]PU
- ▶ Very low traceability:
 - ▶ No link address <-> user (except currency exchanges)
 - ▶ *Laundering*: create new addresses and move coins
- ▶ Publicly verifiable transactions with no middleman

Bitcoin explosion: *interesting* transactions

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Silk Road
anonymous market

messages **1** | orders **0** | account **฿0.00**

Search

Go

Shop by Category

Drugs 2,399

Cannabis 341

Dissociatives 65

Ecstasy 209

Opioids 156

Other 144

Precursors 12

Prescription 526

Psychedelics 427

Stimulants 273

Apparel 114

Art 7

Books 743

Collectibles 12

Computer equipment 19

Custom Orders 26

Digital goods 310

Drug paraphernalia 89

Electronics 20

Erotica 319

Fireworks 2

Food 3

Forgeries 58

Hardware 2

Home & Garden 7

Jewelry 48

Lab Supplies 5

Lotteries & games 29

Medical 5



5x - 10mg Dexedrine (Pure Dextroamphetamine)

฿4.94




2 x 0,25 mg Xanax (Alprazolam)

฿1.50



Malana charas hand rubbed Indian hash 100g

฿75.83



1 Gram OG KUSH OIL 81% THC 90% TOTAL

฿4.13



14 grams (1/2 Ounce) of Nebula JWH-122

฿2.63



3.5g Crystal Meth Ice Shards

฿31.92



20 x 25mg Cialis

฿2.57



!!!!...Psilocybe-Cubensis-Chocolate...!!!!

฿18.15



100 x Orange Star Very high MDMA content 180mg



100x 200mg White XTC 'Speakers'



3g Methydone Crystals - \$50- Lab Grade



15mg Adderall Extended Release (1 Capsule)

Bitcoin explosion: *interesting* transactions

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
Bitcoin explosion: malware boom

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Bitcoin-mining malware reportedly found on Google Play

Fake wallpaper apps turned phones into bots for the power- and computationally intensive process of producing crypto-currency, a mobile security firm warns.

Number of attacks



Infecting DVRs with Bitcoin-mining malware even easier than you suspected

It took just a day for the Internet-connected device to be under attackers' spell.

Secret Bitcoin mining code added to e-sports software sparks outrage

E-sports league made \$3,600 using the power-hungry GPUs of its users, admin admits.

Yahoo malware turned PCs into Bitcoin miners

Malicious ads served to Yahoo users were designed to transform computers into a Bitcoin mining operation, according to a security firm.

Crypto-currency: Security Impact

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► Not really a standard threat

- Small disruption (consuming resources)
- No real impact on system integrity
- Interesting way of detecting a compromise: 100% CPU

► BUT: insider threat

- What prevent users to mine crypto-currencies?
- What are the consequences of mining?

New threat: Crypto-lockers

What is Cryptolocker?

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You're infected—if you want to see your data again, pay us \$300 in Bitcoins

Ransomware comes of age with unbreakable crypto, anonymous payments.

- ▶ **No infection method by itself (run by something else)**
- ▶ **Impressive blackmail:**
 - ▶ Use proper cryptography to encrypt all interesting files
 - ▶ Increase pressure: threat to delete private key
- ▶ **'Standard' business: only few reports of non-decryption**
- ▶ **Enormous results: > 40'000 BTC**

Cryptolocker prevention

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► Do backups:

- Backups on an external system (e.g. tape backups)
- Off line backups

► Follow the ‘Least Privilege Principle’:

- Give ‘Read only’ accesses when possible (e.g. websites)
- Remove outdated permissions


► Never pay

- Paying increase the incentive to make malware
- There is no proof they will give you data back or won't re-attack you
- Crypto-locker case: private key database discovered!

New *Attackers*: Nations

Hardware interception

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(TS//SI//NF) Left: Intercepted packages are opened carefully; Right: A “load station” implants a beacon

Cisco CEO to Obama: Don't let NSA intercept and hack our gear

Chambers says alleged TAO program undermines industry.

Further improving digital certificate security

Saturday, December 7, 2013 11:43 AM

Posted by Adam Langley, Security Engineer

Late on December 3rd, we became aware of unauthorized digital certificates for several Google domains. We investigated immediately and found the certificate was issued by an [intermediate certificate authority](#) (CA) linking back to ANSSI, a French certificate authority. Intermediate CA certificates carry the full authority of the CA, so anyone who has one can use it to create a certificate for any website they wish to impersonate.

In response, we updated Chrome's certificate revocation metadata immediately to block that intermediate CA, and then alerted ANSSI and other browser vendors. Our actions addressed the immediate problem for our users.

ANSSI has found that the intermediate CA certificate was used in a commercial device, on a private network, to inspect encrypted traffic with the knowledge of the users on that network. This was a violation of their procedures and they have asked for the certificate in question to be revoked by browsers. We updated Chrome's revocation metadata again to implement this.

Nations: Security Threats?

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- ▶ **Lot of reports of mass surveillance programs**
 - ▶ Data interception
 - ▶ Hardware backdoors
 - ▶ ...

- ▶ **Examples of malwares used by law enforcement**

- ▶ **From our point of view:**
 - ▶ Able to spend *unlimited* resources
 - ▶ Goal/potential damage unclear

- **Nothing special to do**

Why Computer Security is broken: SSL/TLS example

What is SSL/TLS?

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► Communication layer ensuring:

- Confidentiality: nobody can read the exchanged data
- Authenticity: you know who you are talking to
- Integrity: nobody can change your messages

► Used almost everywhere:

- 's' in HTTPs, SMTPs, IMAPs...
- Implemented in Linux, Windows, Mac OS

► History:

- SSL, SSL v2, SSL v3
- TLS1.0, TLS1.1, TLS1.2, (TLS 1.3)

► Apple SSL: Wrong certificate validation

goto fail; // [Apple SSL bug test site](#)

This site will help you determine whether your computer is vulnerable to [#gotofail](#).

YOUR BROWSER IS VULNERABLE, PATCH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE!

We have examined your OS and browser version information and determined that an active vulnerability test was appropriate. Unfortunately, your browser continued loading our test image after seeing an invalid ServerKeyExchange message. An attacker able to actively intercept your network connections (this is possible on **most WiFi networks**) can freely **snoop on you**, for example when you log into your **bank account**. Please check your browser and operating system for security updates and apply them right away. [Other applications on your system](#) such as mail, chat, financial, social networking and backup apps are also at risk - simply switching browsers will not fully protect you.

Please see [agl's writeup](#) for a full description of the bug.

Apple has released [official iOS updates](#) that resolve this issue.

An [update is now available](#) for OS X Mavericks, please [check for the update and install it](#) right away if you're vulnerable.

Some further explanation of this site can be found in the [FAQ](#).

For more browser SSL/TLS testing check out [How's my SSL?](#) and [SSL Labs](#).

Fan mail, hate mail, bug reports, etc to gotofail@gotofail.com or [@gotofailcom](https://twitter.com/gotofailcom) but requests for server source code will be ignored until everyone has had time to patch. Thanks to Jacob September for help with the stylesheet.

If you'd like to donate, feel free to send bitcoin to [19xUQVwyc5DDo1uoN8dXARtCEfXCrkRyir](https://blockchain.info/address/19xUQVwyc5DDo1uoN8dXARtCEfXCrkRyir) or [give something to EFF](#).

► GNUTLS: Wrong certificate validation


Goto Apple: GnuTLS falls foul of SSL certificate verification issues

Summary: An audit conducted by Red Hat has turned up an SSL certificate verification vulnerability in all versions of GnuTLS.

HeartBleed (OpenSSL)

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HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:



© XKCD

► Apple & GNUTLS: Man In The Middle:

- Someone could intercept and modify protected data
- Mainly a client issue, not a server issue

► Heartbleed: Stealing data from servers (& clients)

- Stealing users passwords
- Stealing server private keys

➤ Long term impact unknown:

- Stolen passwords & keys could still be valid
- Recent discovery of (old) attacks using Heartbleed

Reasons for failures

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- ▶ **Apple: basic programming issue**
- ▶ **GNUTLS: wrong return value**
- ▶ **Heartbleed:**
 - ▶ Basic input validation missing
 - ▶ OpenSSL maintained by few peoples
- **Bad quality code everywhere?**
 - Software has no guaranty: if it breaks, bad luck...
 - Programmers not responsible: only expected to patch quickly!

Heartbleed: Lesson learned?

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Core Infrastructure Initiative

The Core Infrastructure Initiative is a multi-million dollar project housed at The Linux Foundation to fund open source projects that are in the critical path for core computing functions. Inspired by the Heartbleed OpenSSL crisis, The Initiative's funds will be administered by the Linux Foundation and a steering group comprised of backers of the project as well as key open source developers and other industry stakeholders.


The steering group will work with an advisory board of esteemed open source developers to identify and fund open source projects in need. Support from the initiative can include funding for fellowships for key developers to work full time on the open source project, security audits, computing and test infrastructure, travel, face-to-face meeting coordination and other support. Early supporters include:



Heartbleed: fixed? (1 month later)

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All websites affected by the Heartbleed bug



THANKS FOR COMING!

QUESTIONS?

Good old method: credential theft, Windigo

What is Windigo?

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► Large scale malicious operation


- Targeting mainly servers
- Without using 0-days or vulnerability (mostly)

► Botnet building: Ebury

- Openssh Backdoor
- Stealing credential used for Openssh:
 - Password
 - SSH private keys
- Credential exfiltration:
 - Pushed to malicious servers (pseudo DNS queries)
 - Pulled by operators (stored locally)

How does Windigo grow?

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Making money out of Windigo?

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